Independence versus economic development

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INDEPENDENCE VERSUS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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The mobilization system societies are characterized by a strong pressure towards independence from the external system. Since the upper stratum Latin American countries appear as a continuation of the sequence of the MS-societies, we may include them into the analysis[1]. This inclusion may show that the pressure towards independence may be exerted at the expense of economic development expressed by the growth rate of income per capita[2]. In addition, we take into account that E seems to be the dominating variable which discriminates between the traditional feudal and the modern industrial societies[3].

CNP and the indicator for independence, Trade/GNP, appear to be positively associated with the T values among the underdeveloped countries of the world sample[4]. In addition, it can be shown that among the Latin American countries the size of the population (P) is also positively associated with T, and this may be interpreted in the same sense[5]. The causal relationships between power or independence and T can be conceived as pointing in both directions: power as a prerequisite for higher T values or T as a determinant of the independence drive.

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1) P. Heintz, The Place of Latin American Societies in the International Stratification System, Bulletin des Soziologischen Institutes der Universität Zürich, 3, 1967, pp.1.
2) See Table 1.
3) P. Heintz, Mobilization System (and Latin American Upper Stratum) Societies, Bulletin des Soziologischen Institutes, 6, 1968, pp. 1.
4) See P. Heintz, Comparative Analyses of Latin American Contexts, Bulletin des Soziologischen Institutes, 5, 1967, p.18-20.
5) See Annex Table 8.

We conceive independence as a behaviour similar to that which leads to incompleteness of status configuration, i.e. as a behaviour to be explained as a movement which intends to disconnect the societal unit from the external system in order to avoi avoid the power deficit involved in the system. It is conceived here as an autonomous behaviour of the individual unit and not as a collective behaviour aimed at generating new values.

Since it is possible that the international system has not (yet) elaborated any definition of equilibrium between the nations' positions on different status lines, all power deficits and power excesses may be assimilated to rank tensions and interpreted in this sense. This means that we would not have to reckon with a process of legitimization of the goals of the external system through disequilibrium tensions referred to a societally defined equilibrium and that we might assume the existence of a positive association between the prestige-power disequilibrium and a behaviour which intends to disconnect the unit from the system, i.e. the independence behaviour.

The theory would then postulate a sequence of movements for systems such as the international one which have no societal definition of equilibrium between status positions[1]:

a) A prestige-power disequilibrium would emerge as a consequence of the differential accessibility of prestige and power. This phase is postulated as a consequence of the lack of a societally defined equilibrium which implies an institutionalization of power deficits and power excesses.

b) Such a power deficit would produce a tendency towards independence as a means for getting out of the power deficit. This obviously does not exclude a simultaneous power driving due to the same cause.

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1) It may also be that such a definition exists but that it is comparatively weak.

c) This movement towards independence might be achieved among the units with relatively low rank through the concentration of development or a centralistic development pattern dominated by urban concentration (U) and increase of labour division (LD) with a subsequent increase of the internal structural tensions between subnational units (indicated, for example, by relatively high ES-I values). Such an increase of the internal power differentiation could eventually lead to a repetition of the process described under a) and b) on the level of the national subunits, i.e. to a pattern of decentralistic development within units with relatively high rank.

The following table refers to the countries of the pattern between U and E (EP) which correspond to the phase that is characteristic for the mobilization system societies (see Graph 1).

Table 1

	U	ΔI
Argentina	69.3	-5.3
Chile	69.2	17.1
Iceland	60.5	21.1
Spain	59.5	64.4
Greece	55.9	69.7
Panama	49.5	21.1
Norway	49.0	34.2
Poland	47.7	76.3
Italy	45.3	71.0
Puerto Rico	41.9	65.7
Taiwan	35.9	42.1
Mexico	35.9	30.2
Malaya	33.9	7.9
Tunisia	29.7	26.3
South Korea	27.7	31.9
Paraguay	22.2	-13.2
Algeria	21.1	61.8
Peru	20.8	19.7
Cyprus	20.4	18.4

As the table shows there is a positive correlation between U and ΔI among the countries with relatively low U values and a negative correlation between the countries with relatively high U values. The major deviations refer to Spain, Greece, Malaya and Algeria.

The first phase (a) mentioned above may lead to a considerable amount of internal conflict due to a lack of synchronic development of the occupational structure ((E-I)-ES). Such a conflict could be resolved by a policy of increasing external dependency (technological modernization > social modernization) with the aim of generating an additional income per capita on the national level. Anyway, the lagging ES excludes or postpones a policy aimed at increasing independence. We may expect that such a policy would be associated with relatively low power (P) and a relatively traditional internal structure (ES).

We further expect that a gradual increase of independence accompanying the increase of the prestige-power disequilibrium would make easier the transformation of the emerging power deficit into economic development ($E\text{-}I \xrightarrow{+} \Delta I$). This is so because a successful transformation requires a certain amount of political autonomy.

The most important patterns we try to interpret in terms of the theory outlined above are those between E and U and between E and labour division (LD) as shown by Graph 1 and 2.

Graph 1



1 United States
5 Sweden
6 Australia
7 New Zealand
8 Belgium
12 France
14 Netherlands
17 Czechoslovakia
20 USSR
25 Italy
26 Argentina
27 Hungary
29 Poland
31 Cuba
35 Chile
39 Rumania
42 Greece
43 Panama
45 Japan
49 Yugoslavia
52 Dominican Rep.
57 Turkey
60 Honduras
61 Ecuador
64 Algeria
70 Taiwan
71 Nicaragua
76 Morocco
81 Jordan
84 Iran
91 Cambodia
103 Pakistan
110 Libya
121 Nepal

Graph 2



1	United States	21	East Germany	49	Yugoslavia
2	Canada	23	Puerto Rico	51	Mexico
3	Switzerland	24	Ireland	52	Dominican Republic
10	Norway	28	Uruguay	55	Portugal
12	France	29	Poland	60	Honduras
13	West Germany	31	Cuba	63	Peru
14	Netherlands	35	Chile	68	Ghana
15	Finland	40	Costa Rica	70	Taiwan
16	Israel	42	Greece	83	Paraguay
17	Czechoslovakia	43	Panama	87	Liberia
19	Venezuela	44	Jamaica	101	India
20	USSR	45	Japan	110	Libya

The pattern which connects education (EP) and labour division (LD) and which expresses a sequence of lead and lag of the prestige indicator E with respect to the independence indicator LD indicates a movement which fluctuates around a straight line corresponding to a perfect linear association between both terms and leading from a country like Liberia to US.

We suggest that the greater the fluctuations with respect to the straight line the slower the movement of development (see Graph 3). On the basis of such a consideration we could interpret in dynamic terms the existing pattern referred to a certain historic moment. This would mean that the countries with higher degrees of development performed a movement with lower fluctuations whereas the countries with lower degrees of development performed a movement with stronger fluctuations, the lower ranking countries' deviations from the linear pattern being due to rigidity of ES and lack of power, the higher ranking countries' deviations being due to the difficulties of initiating a decentralistic development pattern.[1)]

Another possible interpretation would be that the difference of development of the countries included into the pattern were due to a difference of speed with which they run through the same sequence of phases as outlined above. We shall try to take a decision between these alternative interpretations with the help of a simple simulation program.

In order to incorporate the Latin American data we shall now analyse in more details the more significant associations between our major structural variables and ΔI, ΔE and ΔU, subdividing the Latin American countries into a low and a high stratum. The following table summarizes these correlations indicating by "*" those which are similar between both strata (See correlation matrices, Annex to P.Heintz, Comparative Analyses of Latin American Contexts, Bulletin, 5, pp. 45).

1) These difficulties would be analogous to the difficulties involved in phase (a) mentioned above, taking into account internal migration as a consequence of an internal structural relationship I/E-I : -.

Graph 3



Table 2

Low Latin American Countries

	Δ I(1954-59)	developed countries	Δ E	developed countries	Δ U	developed countries
I	.50	-.57	.48	.20	(.27)	-.35
E	(.24)	-.44	-.50*	-.24	.79*	(-.16)
U	-.08	.06	-.40*	-.52	.30(*)	.49
ES	(.16)	-.48	-.67*	0	.76*	-.38
ES-I	-.31*	.40	-.57(*)	0	.36*	.23
E-I	(.08)	.52	-.57*	(-.13)	.64	.34
U-I	-.39	.43	-.50*	-.35	(.09)	.39
T	(-.14)	.55	-.64*	-.27	.44	.42
T-ES	(-.22)	.58	-.71(*)	(-.23)	.36	.45
A	-.51	.48	.64	0	(-.19)	.40
Δ I			(-.15)	-.31	.58	.74
Δ E	(-.15)	-.31			-.54*	-.48
Δ U	.58	.74	-.54*	-.48		

Table 3

High Latin American Countries

	Δ I(1954-59)	developed countries	Δ E	developed countries	Δ U	developed countries
I	-.58	-.57	-.65	.20	(.02)	-.35
E	-.85	-.44	-.85*	-.24	.30*	(-.16)
U	-.59	(.06)	-.72*	-.52	(.24)(*)	.49
ES	-.86	-.48	-.52*	0	.44*	-.38
ES-I	-.48*	.40	(-.27)(*)	0	.41*	.23
E-I	-.32	.52	-.37*	(-.13)	(.17)	.34
U-I	(-.12)	.43	-.58*	-.35	(-.11)	.39
T	(-.18)	.55	-.47*	-.27	(-.03)	.42
T-ES	(.19)	.58	(-.23)(*)	(-.23)	(-.11)	.45
A	.53	.48	(.14)	0	-.31	.40
Δ I			.71	-.31	(-.17)	.74
Δ E	.71	-.31			-.48*	-.48
Δ U	(-.17)	.74	-.48*	-.48		

Most remarkable are the differences between both strata with respect to the correlations $\Delta E / \Delta I$ and $\Delta U / \Delta I$.

Table 4

	high Latin American countries	low Latin American countries
$\Delta E / \Delta I$	.71	-.15
$\Delta U / \Delta I$	-.17	.58

Tables 2 and 3 show that on the level of all Latin American countries ΔE and ΔU mainly depend upon E, ES and U. But the associations are inverted, i.e. for ΔE they are negative and for ΔU positive. In addition, the $\Delta E/\Delta U$ relationship is negative. We may interpret this as a compensatory movement between E and U. The increasing prestige is compensated by an increasing growth of independence (U) and the increasing independence leads to a slowing down of the growth of prestige. If this were so, we would predict that this process would tend to come to an end when the growth of independence would also start slowing down ($U/\Delta U$: -). This is the case among the upper upper Latin American countries (see Bulletin des Soziologischen Institutes der Universität Zürich, 5, Table 28, p. 28).

One major difference between the lower and higher Latin American countries refers to ΔI : the lower countries show a positive relationship between ΔI and ΔU, and the higher a positive relationship between ΔI and ΔE.

Concerning the lower Latin American countries we may guess that if E, ES and E-I generate ΔU, then ΔU generates ΔI. This is in accordance with the negative correlation $A/\Delta I$. If E or E-I generated ΔU but ΔU did not generate ΔES, we would expect ΔU not to produce ΔI.

Concerning the higher Latin American countries, we guess that once a certain degree of independence has been reached, ΔE becomes instrumental for generating ΔI, but at the same time ΔE is decreasing with the increasing rank of the society.

The effect of internal contradictions explained by the rigidity of ES seems to be rather atypical on the level of the world sample. In consequence we may assume that the fluctuations on the E/LD pattern are relatively strong among the Latin American countries in comparison with others on the same level of development (see Table 34 of P. Heintz, Comparative Analyses of Latin American Contexts, Bulletin des Soziologischen Institutes der Universität Zürich, 5, p. 32).

All these considerations imply a certain revision of the theory used up to now.

1) We introduce independence in the sense of retreatism from the external system. This means that the nationalism which corresponds to the combination of high T and independence values is not so much bound to the system as we assumed before when T was seen as mainly associated with ΔI.

2) On the basis of this we now assume - and this is confirmed by the Latin American countries - that the major structural tension measured by E-I does not only generate ΔI but also ΔU.

3) We may conceive the size of population as an important condition for achieving relative independence. This is especially so if independence is associated with urbanization and a centralistic pattern of development. Indeed P and U are positively associated. The same may also be true for the conditions which have been called the U-brake, i.e. cultural heterogeneity, sectionalism and NONA-U.

A N N E X

Data (Rank)

Country	P	Trade/GNP (Independence)	U-I	E-I	T	ES	I
Brazil	1 hh	1 hh	6	13	9	10	8 h
Mexico	2 hh	2 hh	7	12	11	8	10 h
Argentina	3 hh	5 hh	2	1	2	1	2 hh
Columbia	4 hh	4 hh	10	8	6	4	9 h
Peru	5 hh	14 l	13	11	14	12	16 ll
Chile	6 h	3 hh	1	3	1	6	5 hh
Venezuela	7 h	18 ll	3	14	8	7	1 hh
Cuba	8 h	19 ll	4	6	3	5	4 hh
Ecuador	9 h	7/8/9 h	11	10	10	13	14/15 l
Haiti	10 h	6 h	19	20	19	20	19 ll
Guatemala	11 l	11 l	16	19	18	17	14/15 l
Bolivia	12 l	20 ll	8	18	15	18	20 ll
Dom. Republic	13 l	12/13 l	18	9	12	16	11 l
Uruguay	14 l	7/8/9 h	-	4	-	2	3 hh
El Salvador	15 l	17 ll	14	17	17	14	12 l
Honduras	16 ll	12/13 l	15	15	16	19	13 l
Paraguay	17 ll	7/8/9 h	12	5	5	11	18 ll
Nicaragua	18 ll	15 l	9	16	13	15	17 ll
Costa Rica	19 ll	16 ll	17	2	7	3	6 h
Panama	20 ll	10 h	5	7	4	9	7 h

Table 1

Trade/GNP = Independence \ Population	hh	h	l	ll	d %
hh	4	1			+40 %
h		2	1	2 Paraguay Panama	
l	1 Peru		2	2	-40 %
ll		2 Venez. Cuba	2	1	

(7) (3) (3) (7)

Table 2

E-I \ Trade/GNP = Independence	hh	h	l	ll	d %
hh	2	3		1 Costa Rica	+40 %
h	1	1	1	1 Cuba	
l	2 Brazil Mexico		2	1	-40 %
ll		1 Haiti	2	2	

(7) (3) (3) (7)

Table 3 [1]

Trade/GNP = Independence

T \	hh	h	l	ll
hh	2	2		1 Cuba
		(7)	(3)	
h	2	1		2 Venezuela, Costa Rica
l	1 Mexico		3	1
		(2)	(7)	
ll		1 Haiti	2	1

1) Confirmed on the level of underdeveloped countries.

Table 4

E - I

ES \	hh	h	l	ll
hh	3	2		
		(7)	(2)	
h	1	1	2	
l		3	1	2
		(4)	(7)	
ll		1 Dom.Rep.	1	3

Table 5

ES \ T	hh	h	l	ll
hh	2	2		
		(8)	(1)	
h	2	2	1	
l	1 Paraguay	1	2	1
		(2)	(8)	
ll		2 Bolivia Nicaragua	2	3

Table 6

I \ ES	hh	h	l	ll
hh	3	2 Chile Venezuela		2 Paraguay Panama
		(10)		
h	2 Columbia CostaRica	3		1 Costa Rica
l	2 Mexico Peru	1	2	Guatemala 3 Domin.Rep. Honduras
			(10)	
ll		1 Haiti	Peru 3 Paraguay Nicaragua	2

P $\xrightarrow{+}$ Trade/GNP = Independence $\xrightarrow{+}$ E-I or T $\xrightarrow{+}$ ES $\xrightarrow{+}$ I

Table 7

I \ U - I	hh	h	l	ll
hh	4			
		8		1
h	1	3		1 Costa Rica
l			3	2
		2		8
ll		2 Bolivia Nicaragua	2	1

Table 8

T \ P	hh	h	l	ll
hh	1	2		2 Paraguay Panama
		6		3
h	2	1		1 Costa Rica
l	2 Mexico Peru	1	2	1
		4		6
ll		1 Haiti	2	1